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WYETH v. LEVINE:  
EXAMINING THE DOCTRINE OF 
IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN STATE-
LAW TORT CLAIMS 
ALLISON KOSTECKA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wyeth v. Levine has been heralded “The Mother of all Preemption 
Cases”1 and “the business case of the century.”2 The significance of the 
decision transcends the individuals involved and could have 
substantial repercussions for both consumers and drug 
manufacturers.3 
The tragic facts giving rise to this case began in April 2000, when 
respondent Diana Levine lost an arm to gangrene after the improper 
administration of Phenergan, an anti-nausea drug manufactured by 
Wyeth.4 Levine sued Wyeth in a Vermont state court alleging 
negligence for failure to provide a warning label that strongly 
cautioned against, or even proscribed, certain methods of 
administering Phenergan.5 
Wyeth’s defense to the suit was based on an implied preemption 
theory. Wyeth argued that the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(“FDA”) explicit approval of Phenergan’s warning label preempted 
 
 * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Jacob Goldstein, Wyeth v. Levine: The Mother of All Preemption Cases, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 19, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/09/19/wyeth-v-levine-the-mother-of-all-
preemption-cases/. 
 2. Alicia Mundy and Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122506300017470355.html. 
 3. See id. (reporting that the decision could sharply limit an individual’s right to sue drug 
manufacturing companies for death or injury caused by medicine, resulting in billon-dollar 
savings for the pharmaceutical industry in litigation and settlement costs). 
 4. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006). 
 5. Id. 
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Levine’s common law cause of action.6 The jury found in favor of 
Levine and awarded her $2.4 million in economic and $5 million in 
non-economic damages.7 
In October 2006, the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, holding that Levine’s claims were not 
preempted by the FDA’s approval of the Phenergan label.8 The 
United States Supreme Court granted Wyeth’s petition for certiorari 
to decide whether FDA approval of prescription drug labels preempts 
state law product liability claims.9 
II.  FACTS 
A. Circumstances Giving Rise to Levine’s Injury 
Diana Levine, a professional musician, habitually suffered from 
intense migraines accompanied by severe nausea.10 On several 
occasions, Levine went to Northeast Washington County Community 
Health Center (Health Center) to treat her ailment.11 Her typical 
treatment consisted of a dosage of Demerol for the migraine pain and 
a dosage of Phenergan for the nausea.12 
The preferred method of administering Phenergan is through an 
intramuscular injection, but the drug can also be administered 
through an intravenous (“IV”) injection.13 The proffered benefit of 
intravenously administering Phenergan is more immediate nausea 
relief,14 but there are also significant risks associated with IV 
administration, including a chance that arterial blood will be exposed 
to the drug.15 Phenergan can cause severe tissue deterioration and 
lead to gangrene when exposed to arterial blood.16 Because there is no 
 
 6. Id. at 182–83. 
 7. Id. The original jury award was reduced to $6.7 million. 
 8. Id. at 183. 
 9. Brief for the Respondent at i, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Aug. 7, 2008). 
 10. Adam Liptak, Drug Label, Maimed Patient and Crucial Test for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/us/19scotus.html. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 9. 
 14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2007). 
 15. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 10. 
 16. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 183 n.1. 
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treatment that can reverse the onset of gangrene after exposure 
occurs, amputation of the affected appendage is invariably required.17 
There are two procedures available for the intravenous 
administration of Phenergan: the “IV drip” procedure and the “IV 
push” procedure.18 The IV-drip procedure allows gravity to pull the 
medication mixed with saline solution slowly into the patient’s veins 
through tubing attached to a hanging IV bag; the IV-push procedure 
directly forces the medicine into a patent’s vein using a syringe.19 The 
IV-push procedure significantly increases the risk of arterial blood 
being exposed to Phenergan due to the likelihood of inadvertently 
puncturing an artery or piercing through a vein.20 
In April 2000, Levine suffered from a migraine and nausea and 
went to the Health Center for her usual treatment.21 Levine’s initial 
dose of Phenergan was administered through an intramuscular 
injection.22 Unfortunately, her nausea did not subside and later that 
day she returned to the Health Center where a second dose of 
Phenergan was administered by an IV-push procedure.23 According to 
trial testimony, the physician treating Levine did not understand the 
severe risks associated with the IV-push procedure.24 The physician 
testified that he would have used the safer IV-drip method of 
intravenous administration had the warning been apparent on the 
drug’s label.25 
The Phenergan administered through the IV-push procedure 
made contact with Levine’s arterial blood26 and she suffered from a 
swift onset of gangrene that ultimately resulted in the amputation of 
her hand and forearm.27 This tragically ended Levine’s career as a 
musician. 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 9. 
 19. Id. at 10. 
 20. Id. The proper functioning of the drip bag requires appropriate placement into a vein, 
allowing for mistakes to be corrected before the flow of the drug begins. Thus, the risk of 
inadvertent arterial exposure with the IV-drip procedure is much less than the risk associated 
with the IV-push procedure. Id. 
 21. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 182. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006). 
 27. Id. 
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B. Evolution of the FDA’s approval of Phenergan 
In 1955, the FDA initially evaluated and approved Phenergan 
along with directions that stated the drug could be safely 
administered through either intramuscular or intravenous injection.28 
Twelve years later, Wyeth discovered that exposure of Phenergan to 
arterial blood could cause gangrene and that IV administration of 
Phenergan increased the likelihood that such exposure would occur.29 
Wyeth reported this discovery to the FDA and in the following years 
Wyeth, often at the FDA’s request, continually refined the Phenergan 
label with respect to the warning for IV administration.30 Despite 
incessant modification to the Phenergan label, there is no evidence 
that Wyeth or the FDA considered the relative safety of the two 
methods of IV administration (IV-push as opposed to IV-drip) or 
thought to emphasize the heightened risk of, or even proscribe the use 
of, the IV-push procedure.31 
In 1979, the FDA enacted new regulations specifying the format 
required for all prescription drug labels.32 To comply with the new 
rules, Wyeth submitted a Supplemental New Drug Application with a 
revised label.33 The new label was approved in 1998, after years of 
revision.34 The Phenergan warning used in April 2000 was two pages 
long and stated in relevant part: 
 
 28. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. May 2008). 
 29. Id. at 12. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 188–89 (“Defendant has provided a number of letters exchanged by 
the FDA and defendant regarding Phenergan’s label, but these letters do not indicate the 
FDA’s opinion of the value of IV-push administration. Neither the letters nor any other 
evidence presented to the jury indicated that the FDA wished to preserve the use of IV-push as 
a method of administering Phenergan.”). 
 32. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 14. 
 33. Id. at 16. 
 34. Id. In 1987, the FDA recommended revisions pertaining to, among other things, the 
warning against inadvertent intra-arterial injection on the Phenergan label. In 1988, Wyeth 
incorporated the suggested changes as well as its own alterations and resubmitted the label to 
the FDA for final approval. The draft stated in relevant part: 
INADVERTANT INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION: There are reports of necrosis 
leading to gangrene, requiring amputation, following injection of [Phenergan], usually 
in conjunction with other drugs; the intravenous route was intended in these cases, but 
arterial or partial arterial placement of the needle is now suspect . . . . 
There is no established treatment other than prevention: 
1) Beware of the close proximity of arteries and veins at commonly used injection 
sites and consider the possibility of aberrant arteries. 
2) When used intravenously, [Phenergan] should be given in a concentration no 
greater than 25 mg/ ml and a rate not to exceed 25mg/minute. Injection through a 
properly running intravenous infusion may enhance the possibility of detecting 
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INADVERTANT INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION: Due to the 
close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly 
used for intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to 
avoid perivascular extravasations or inadvertent intra-arterial 
injection. Reports compatible with inadvertent intra-arterial 
injection of (Phenergan), usually in conjunction with other drugs 
intended for intravenous use, suggest that pain, severe chemical 
irritation, severe spasm of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene 
requiring amputation are likely under such circumstances. 
Intravenous injection was intended in all the cases reported but 
perivascular extravasations or arterial placement of the needle is 
now suspect. There is no proven successful management of this 
condition after it occurs . . . . 
When administering any irritant drug intravenously it is usually 
preferable to inject it through the tubing of an intravenous 
infusion set that is known to be functioning satisfactorily.35 
Following her amputation, Levine sued Wyeth for failure to warn 
consumers of the potential dangers associated with the IV-push 
administration of Phenergan. Wyeth moved for summary judgment 
prior to trial and for judgment as a matter of law following the trial, 
both times asserting two arguments based on implied preemption: (1) 
that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both the FDA’s 
labeling requirements and the demands of Vermont’s common law; 
and (2) that liability in state courts for the use of FDA-approved 
labels presents an obstacle to the federal objectives of the Federal 
Drug and Cosmetics Act.36 Both motions were denied and the jury 
found in favor of Levine.37 
 
arterial placement. In addition, this results in delivery of a lower concentration of 
any arteriolar irritant. See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 183 n.1 (Vt. 2006). 
This draft was rejected by the FDA and the FDA told Wyeth to “retain the verbiage in the 
current label,” pertaining to inadvertent intra-arterial injections. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
28, at 16. The FDA rejection was perhaps due to the view that the changes made were “non-
substantive and rejected . . . for formatting reasons.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 13. 
Wyeth once again reworked the Phenergan label and submitted it to the FDA on May 8, 1998, 
when it was finally approved. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 16. The FDA approval letter 
specified that the final printed label insert should be identical to the approved draft. Id. 
 35. See Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 183 n.1 (quoting the Phenergan label). 
 36. Id. at 183. 
 37. Id. at 182. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision to uphold Levine’s award 
was primarily predicated on the requirements of the preemption 
doctrine, the federal regulatory authority of the FDA, and the 
intersection of the FDA’s authority and state common law. 
A. The Doctrine of Preemption 
According to the United States Constitution, federal law is the 
“supreme Law of the Land.”38 This basic concept lays the foundational 
groundwork for the Supremacy Clause, which, according to the 
Supreme Court, embodies the notion that “state law that conflicts 
with federal law is ‘without effect.’”39 The preemption doctrine can be 
a defense to state law claims that conflict with federal law or federal 
objectives.40 Out of respect for state sovereignty, there is a 
presumption against preemption.41 This presumption is strengthened 
when the area of law at issue has a long history of state regulation.42 
There are two general circumstances in which federal law 
preempts state law. First, Congress can explicitly preempt state law via 
statutory language or language in the legislative history.43 Second, 
Congress can express its intent to control an entire field of regulation 
leaving states no option to supplement the federal regulation with 
additional requirements.44 
Congressional intent to preempt state law can be discovered 
through an examination of the statute itself, the legislative history, and 
the pervasiveness of the federal regulations.45 If a thorough 
 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 39. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
 40. E.g., Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1001 (2008) (holding FDA’s premarket 
approval process established federal regulations that preempted plaintiff’s state law claims for 
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty). 
 41. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the states are 
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action.”). 
 42. E.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (explaining that a long 
history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisons added force to the presumption 
against preemption by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act). 
 43. Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Federal pre-emption of state common-law products 
liability clams pertaining to drugs, medical devices, and other health-related items, 98 A.L.R. FED. 
124 (1990). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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examination of the aforementioned items does not shed insight on 
congressional intent, the judiciary can consider the nature of the 
statutory scheme and the logistics of allowing both federal and state 
regulation.46 If there is a national interest in uniformity, and dual 
regulation would detract from that uniformity, then congressional 
intent to preempt can be inferred.47 Congressional intent to preempt 
can also be inferred when the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of congressional objectives.48 
Only clear congressional intent to supersede state law can 
overcome the presumption against preemption.49 But, congressional 
intent can be express or implied.50 Without evidence of express 
preemption, implied preemption can prevail only if there is an actual 
conflict between federal and state law.51 An actual conflict exists when 
“it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and 
federal requirements, or when state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”52 
B. Regulatory Authority of the FDA 
For much of the 19th century, states regulated domestically 
produced foods and drugs.53 After several prominent disasters 
resulted from the inadequacy of these regulations, public support 
increased for federal regulation of the food and drug industry.54 In 
response to the growing public demand, Congress passed the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) in 1938. 55 The FDCA provided for 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) as the regulatory agency 
in charge of evaluating and approving all drugs sold in the United 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 50. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(“In the absence of an 
express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with 
federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 51. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 52. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
 53. John P. Swann, FDA, in THE HISTORICAL GUIDE TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
(George Kurian, ed, 1998). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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States.56 The FDA is the only federal agency monitoring the safety, 
efficacy, and accessibility of drugs in the United States’ market.57 To 
do this, the FDA requires drug manufacturers to show that their drugs 
are “safe and effective” for approved uses and that the labeling is not 
“false or misleading.”58 
The FDA’s approval process begins when the drug manufacturer 
submits a New Drug Application (NDA) for approval.59 The FDA 
completes its evaluation according to the following criteria set forth in 
the FDCA: (1) whether test results establish that the drug is “safe for 
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in 
the proposed labeling;” (2) whether there is “substantial evidence that 
the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have 
under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in 
the proposed labeling;” and (3) whether, “based on a fair evaluation 
of all material facts, such labeling is false or misleading.”60 If the 
statutory elements are satisfied, the FDA must approve the NDA;61 
though prior to the drug’s distribution, the FDA requires a final label 
submission and can compel changes if necessary.62 
The drug manufacturer is responsible for conducting the research 
and testing prior to the NDA’s submission.63 When testing a new drug, 
clinical trials are relatively small and focused on isolating variables 
concerning the disposition of the tested individuals.64 Although these 
limitations are beneficial for testing the specific effects of the drug, 
they often fail to accurately demonstrate how the drug will work 
when prescribed to the diverse population at large.65 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (West 2008); see also United States v. Sullivan 332 
U.S. 689, 696 (1948) (stating the primary goal in enacting the FDCA was “to protect consumers 
from dangerous products”). 
 58. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(b), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (1962) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b) (West 2006)). 
 59. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a)(West 2006). 
 60. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d). 
 61. Id. 
 62. 21 U.S.C.A. §355(b)(1)(F). 
 63. David A. Kessler and David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to 
Preempt Failure-to-Warm Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 471 (2008). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 471–72 (“[M]ost clinical studies ‘can detect 
drug-related injuries that occur at a rate of between one in 500 and one in 1,000. Yet if the drug 
is used by 200,000 people . . . a serious adverse event appearing in as few as one in 10,000 people 
is very significant, since it would occur 20 times. These rare reactions can be identified only after 
a drug has been widely used.’”) (quoting from William B. Schultz, How to Improve Drug Safety, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, at A35) 
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When manufacturers discover unanticipated or adverse affects 
associated with approved drugs, they are required to notify the FDA 
and update consumer warnings.66 Because the FDA approval process 
can be time consuming, a drug manufacturer can bypass the FDA 
approval process and make label modifications on their own when 
faced with compelling public safety concerns.67 In fact, drug 
manufacturers are statutorily required to alter a drug’s label prior to 
FDA approval when necessary for the safe administration of the 
drug.68 Statutory language allows drug manufacturers to bypass the 
approval process in order: 
(A) To add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, 
or adverse reaction; 
(B) To add or strengthen a statement about drug abuse, 
dependence, psychological effect or over dosage; 
(C) To add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and 
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product . . . .69 
If making a change prior to FDA approval, the drug manufacturer 
must immediately inform the FDA and send a Supplemental New 
Drug Application for a full review after-the-fact.70 
C. Intersection of FDA Regulations and State Common Law 
When the FDCA was enacted in 1938, states had long-standing 
legal remedies for patients injured by defective or mislabeled drugs.71 
Relying on this tradition of state regulation, Congress did not provide 
an express preemption clause in the FDCA.72 In the 1962 amendments 
to the FDCA, Congress explicitly stated its position on FDA approval 
and preemption: “Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the 
 
 66. 21 C.F.R.§ 314.70(a) (2006). 
 67. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). 
 68. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (“labeling must be revised to include a warning about a 
clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a 
drug”). 
 69. 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)–(C). 
 70. 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6). 
 71. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 21. 
 72. See Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 462 (“No appellate court, before or after the 
advent of the FDA, has held that a state-law failure-to-warn claim for a prescription drug is 
preempted by federal law. And Congress has not acted to preempt or limit state damage 
actions, even though it has long been aware of tort litigation over drug products . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as 
invalidating any provision of State law . . . unless there is a direct and 
positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of 
State law.”73 The FDA resisted becoming involved in state tort 
litigation to preserve the incentive for drug manufacturers to discover 
and publicize unknown side-effects and risks.74 This incentive enabled 
the agency to better protect public health.75 
Taking into account the role of state failure-to-warn claims in 
promoting public safety and the statutory allowance for drug 
manufacturers to make changes without FDA approval, several 
courts, most notably in cases involving the drug Zoloft,76 have held 
that state failure-to-warn claims are not in conflict with federal law.77 
Most of the opinions announcing this rule, however, are unpublished 
state or federal district court opinions so their precedential effect is 
minimal. In addition, at least a few courts have held that FDA 
approval does preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims.78 
Recently, the FDA’s policy on preemption has changed.79 In 2002, 
the FDA began filing amicus briefs in favor of drug manufacturers, 
asking courts to find that federal law preempted state law failure-to-
warn claims.80 The FDA’s new policy on preemption was formalized in 
 
 73. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub.L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 
780, 793. 
 74. Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 463. 
 75. See In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (state law actions make new 
evidence available to the FDA, which can be evaluated when deciding whether labeling changes 
are necessary); 21 C.F.R. § 20.1 (2006); Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 462–63. 
 76. Zoloft, or Sertaline HCI, is used to treat depression and certain anxiety disorders. 
Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 
6, 2004. 
 77. See, e.g., Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2002 WL 181972 at *1–*3 
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2002) (denying preemption for state failure-to-warn claim); Caraker v. 
Sandoz Pharm. Corp, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1032–44 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (denying preemption for 
state failure-to-warn claim); Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 725 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849, 853–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 78. See Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697 at *1 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (granting summary judgment to defendant based on conflict 
preemption because warning advocated by plaintiff would be misleading); Ehilis v. Shire 
Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198 (D.N.D. 2002) (granting summary judgment on the 
basis of conflict preemption after interpreting §314.70(c) to allow unapproved changes only 
temporarily and only in “limited circumstances”). 
 79. Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 463. 
 80. See In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litg., No. M: 05-1699 
CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (observing the reversal in the FDA’s 
view on preemption); Amicus Brief for the United State in Support of the Defendant-Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court’s Order Denying Partial 
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the preamble of a 2006 FDA rule regarding drug labeling.81 The 
agency now asserts that state law decisions in failure-to-warn cases 
impact the ability of the FDA to regulate drugs and to protect public 
health.82 The FDA believes that state court decisions could force drug 
manufacturers to either add warnings that have not been approved by 
the FDA or to add warnings that have been specifically rejected by 
the FDA in order to avoid state liability.83 
IV.   HOLDING 
In a 4-1 decision, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld Levine’s 
failure-to-warn claim and the jury verdict in her favor.84 Relying 
heavily on 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c) and interpreting it to “allow unilateral 
changes to drug labels whenever the manufacturer believes it will 
make the product safer,” the majority found that there was not a 
direct conflict between the trial court’s judgment and federal 
regulations.85 Because drug manufacturers are authorized to make 
unilateral changes, Wyeth could have strengthened the warning on the 
Phenergan label, particularly regarding the risk associated with IV-
push administration, but still complied with FDA regulations.86 “While 
specific federal labeling requirements and state common law duties 
might otherwise leave drug manufacturers with conflicting 
obligations, § 314.70(c) allows manufacturers to avoid state claims 
without violating federal law.”87 
The majority insisted that 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c) not only allows, but 
indeed encourages drug manufacturers to add or strengthen warnings, 
and that the detrimental effects of state failure-to-warn claims 
provide incentive to take this action as soon as possible.88 In this sense, 
 
Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at *15, Motus v. Pfizer, 388 
F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084. 
 81. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 201, 314, 601) (explaining the FDA’s new policy on preemption in preamble to 
amendments). 
 82. Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 463. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006). 
 85. Id. at 187. 
 86. See id. 188–89 (finding no evidence that the FDA’s approval of the Phenergan label 
prevented Wyeth from changing the label to increase safety instructions). 
 87. Id. at 186. 
 88. Id. 
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the majority saw FDA labeling requirements as setting “a floor, but 
not a ceiling, for state regulation.”89 
The majority found no evidence that the FDA’s rejection of the 
proposed label in 1988 was an explicit indication that the FDA 
carefully considered and subsequently decided the benefits to the IV-
push administration outweighed the risks.90 Thus, the FDA’s rejection 
did not constrain Wyeth from modifying its label regarding the IV-
push administration method.91 In rejecting preemption for state 
failure-to-warn claims, the Vermont Supreme Court not only 
demonstrated respect for the historical presumption against 
preemption, but also agreed with most other precedent on the issue.92 
The majority also rejected Wyeth’s implied preemption argument 
because it did not find that the state claim interfered with the purpose 
of the FDCA.93 The congressional purpose underlying the FDCA’s 
enactment and the FDA’s creation was to promote and protect public 
safety.94 The majority determined that state law failure-to-warn claims 
share that purpose.95 The court stated that “under any circumstances 
where it is possible to comply with both state law and the FDCA, the 
state law in question is consistent with the purposes and objections of 
Congress.”96 Therefore, because Wyeth could comply with both state 
and federal law, Wyeth could not argue that compliance interfered 
with Congressional purpose.97 
The Court acknowledged policy arguments both in favor of and 
against finding that state failure-to-warn claims conflict with 
congressional purpose.98 Allowing state failure-to-warn claims could 
make beneficial drugs less available to consumers.99 Curtailing these 
failure-to-warn claims, however, could leave consumers injured by 
harmful drugs without a legal remedy.100 The majority found both 
 
 89. Id. at 188. 
 90. Id. at 189. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 188. 
 93. Id. at 190. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (looking to legislative history as evidence of Congress’s determination that 
“[m]any very helpful State laws are in effect; many such laws in some instances are even 
stronger than Federal laws for the protection of human health”). 
 96. Id. at 191. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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policy arguments moot because the plain language of the 1962 
Amendments indicates that Congress did not intend to interfere with 
state prerogatives unless there was a direct and insurmountable 
conflict.101 
The Vermont Supreme Court refused to defer to the recent FDA 
pro-preemption position reflected in the “Supplementary 
Information” section of amendments to the FDA’s labeling 
requirements. According to the majority, deference is inappropriate 
because these amendments took effect in 2006, two years after this 
incident occurred.102 In addition, deference to agency interpretation of 
a statute or amendment is required only if the statute or amendment 
is ambiguous.103 The Court held that the statute was decidedly 
unambiguous, so deference to the agency interpretation was not 
required.104 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The strength of the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision lies in its 
consistency with Congress’s historical acceptance of state failure-to-
warn claims.105 State law failure-to-warn claims have provided an 
incentive for drug manufacturers to take responsibility for ensuring 
their product is safe.106 Single-handedly regulating the drug market 
would be extremely difficult for the FDA alone; it is charged with an 
enormous task and has been severely under funded.107 Although the 
FDA has an entire division devoted to monitoring drugs post-
approval, according to a report by the Government Accountability 
Office, this division not only “lacks clear and effective processes for 
making decisions,” but also lacks clarity about its organizational role, 
struggles with management oversight, and is limited by data 
 
 101. Id. at 190. 
 102. Id. at 192–93. 
 103. Id. at 192. 
 104. Id. at 192–93. 
 105. See Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 
Stat. 780, 793 (nothing in the statutes that govern the FDA indicate an express or implied intent 
to preempt state law actions); Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 462 (“No appellate court, 
before or after the advent of the FDA, has held that a state-law failure-to-warn claim for a 
prescription drug is preempted by federal law.”). 
 106. See id. at 463 (noting that drug companies have far greater resources than the FDA so 
drug companies need the incentive provided by state law tort actions in order to effectively use 
their resources to monitor drugs on the market and address safety concerns accordingly). 
 107. See Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 484 (describing how the FDA is 
“hamstrung” by resource and authority limitations). 
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constraints.108 With only one hundred employees, this division must 
monitor over eleven thousand drugs on the market.109 In contrast, the 
FDA’s Office of New Drugs employs over one thousand employees to 
review only a few dozen new drug applications each year.110 When 
comparing the small work force monitoring the continued use of 
approved drugs with the frequent discovery of new adverse 
reactions,111 the need for state law to supplement the regulatory 
operations of the FDA becomes apparent. 
An adverse judgment in a state failure-to-warn case does not 
negate the FDA’s approval of a drug;112 nor do state failure-to-warn 
claims force drug companies to revise labels: they simply force the 
companies to pay damages for injuries caused by a faulty label.113 The 
fact that a company can perform a cost-benefit analysis and decide to 
keep its current label114 bolsters the argument that compliance with 
both state and federal law is possible.115 Of course, the underlying 
purpose of state law failure-to-warn actions is to provide incentive for 
drug manufacturers to improve labels to increase safety, but this is not 
a specifically required outcome of such an action.116 
In order to make a valid claim for preemption, Wyeth must 
demonstrate a clear congressional intent to preempt state law.117 Here, 
there is no evidence of that intent in the FDCA or in its 
amendments.118 This is in stark contrast to similar legislation, for 
example the regulation of medical devices, where congress has 
 
 108. Improvement Needed in FDA’s Post-Market Decision-Making and Oversight Process, 
HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-06-402 (U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Drug Safety), Mar. 2006, 
available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-402. 
 109. Id. at 485 (quoting statement from Dr. Bruce S. Psaty). 
 110. Id. (quoting statement from Dr. Bruce S. Psaty). 
 111. Id. at 466. 
 112. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.80(e), 314.80 (2008) (no mention of adverse state law judgments 
affecting FDA approval). 
 113. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 36–37 (observing that state litigation may 
expose the dangers associated with new drugs and prompt revisions of labels but this is not 
required as a by-product of state action). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Brief for Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald Kenney and Dr. David A. Kessler 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, Wyeth v. Levine (No. 06-1429) (Aug. 14, 
2008). 
 117. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (assuming Congress does not 
“cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action”). 
 118. See Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, §202, 76 
Stat. 780, 793 (“Nothing in the amendments . . . shall be construed as invalidating any provision 
of State law . . . .”). 
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explicitly provided a preemption clause limiting state causes of 
action.119 
The weakness in the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision lies in the 
expansive interpretation of the scope of 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). If 
the requirement that a drug manufacturer make a change prior to 
receiving FDA approval is dependent on the revelation of “new” 
information, then there is a valid argument for preemption as no new 
information became available here.120 When the FDA approved 
Phenergan’s label in 1998, it knew of the risks associated with the IV-
push method of administration.121 It even rejected a label that Wyeth 
claims122 contained a stronger warning in reference to the IV-push 
method of administration.123 Thus, changing the label would be an 
explicit contradiction of FDA instructions mandating that the label be 
identical to the draft submitted.124 
In addition Wyeth argues that the regulatory process to approve 
new drugs is nearly identical to the process to approve medical 
devices, and because the Supreme Court recently upheld preemption 
for state-law claims directed at FDA approved medical devices,125 
preemption should also apply to state law claims directed at FDA 
approved drug labels.126 
The Vermont Supreme Court’s holding may also undermine the 
FDA’s authority. The FDCA grants the FDA final authority on the 
content and format of drug labeling.127 The review process for a drug 
label is quite rigorous and time intensive.128 The FDA is required to 
make difficult balancing decisions weighing the benefits of a drug 
against its potential adverse affects.129 When the FDA’s experts 
determine that the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks, the FDA 
 
 119. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (“Congress could have applied the 
pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA. It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause 
that applies only to medical devices.”). 
 120. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. 
Dec. 21, 2007). 
 121. Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d 179, 183 (Vt. 2006). 
 122. The trial court interpreted the proposed changes to be non-substantive and immaterial. 
Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 189. 
 123. Supra note 34; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at 25. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008). 
 126. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 28, at 31. 
 127. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2006). 
 128. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996). 
 129. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at 8. 
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approves the drug.130 Allowing state failure-to-warn claims despite 
FDA approval actually conflicts with the FDA’s determination that 
the drug, as labeled, was safe and effective.131 
For Phenergan, the FDA found that the benefits of allowing 
intravenous administration of Phenergan outweighed the risks.132 The 
experts for Wyeth testified that “extreme nausea can cause a patient 
to lose fluid quickly, which leads to dehydration, a serious medical 
condition” and that “[a] doctor, confronted with a patient in dire need 
of relief from nausea, could reasonably decide that benefits of IV-
push administration would warrant taking its increased risk.”133 The 
IV-push administration of Phenergan allows the drug to take effect 
within five minutes.134 The IV-drip administration requires several 
more minutes in order to take effect and the intramuscular injection 
can take even longer.135 
Allowing state juries to take the balancing role away from the 
FDA interferes with the purpose of the FDA as a federal regulatory 
agency.136 When juries are confronted with horrific facts relating to 
one individual’s experience with a drug, they often fail to consider the 
beneficial aspects of the drug and the thousands of patients who have 
benefited from its use.137 Jury members are not likely to find that a 
warning label provided sufficient information concerning risks when 
the victim of a horrible accident is sitting before them.138 
When threatened with extraordinary damages from jury verdicts, 
drug manufacturers are more likely to limit methods of 
administration or discontinue drugs with potentially harmful side-
effects, despite knowing that the method of administration or the drug 
itself will benefit the majority of users.139 Limiting administration 
options and pulling drugs poses a great harm to the public by 
decreasing availability of advantageous treatments.140 Congressional 
 
 130. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 3. 
 131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at *8. 
 132. Id. at 40. 
 133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 8. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 46. 
 137. Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008). 
 138. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 28, at 46. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. (arguing that the FDA’s responsibility extends past protecting public safety to 
promoting public health, and part of promoting public health involves making decisions to keep 
beneficial, yet risky, drugs available). 
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intent as outlined in the FDCA was not only to have a regulatory 
agency that increased the safety and effectiveness of the drugs sold in 
the United States, but also to have that agency ensure consumer 
accessibility to those drugs.141 Allowing state court verdicts to limit the 
ability of drug manufactures to keep drugs on the market limits the 
FDA’s ability to ensure consumer accessibility to beneficial treatment 
options. 
VI.  ORAL ARGUMENT 
This ruling is not likely to be the sweeping victory in favor of 
preemption for which most big pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
hoping.142 Levine’s arguments traced the historical regulation of 
pharmaceuticals by the FDA and demonstrated that Congress has 
consistently recognized state tort action.143 The absence of an express 
congressional intent to preempt state claims supports Levine’s 
argument that the federal regulations simply provide a minimum level 
of protection that states can supplement.144 In addition, the purpose of 
the FDA’s regulatory authority is to protect public safety.145 As this is, 
in part, the purpose of state tort law as well, the two are not in 
conflict.146 
Levine pointed out that there is no statutory evidence to support 
Wyeth’s argument that labeling changes under 21 C.F.R § 
314.70(c)(6)(2006) must be “new.”147 Rather, drug manufacturers must 
alter labels when they are aware of a significant risk, new or old, that 
is not adequately specified in the label.148 In this case, Wyeth was not 
certain that the FDA had performed a risk-benefit analysis pertaining 
specifically to the IV-push method of administration, which detracted 
 
 141. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (West 2008) (stating the purpose of the FDA is to 
promote safety, effectiveness, and accessibility of drugs sold in the US market). 
 142. See Tony Mauro, High Court Appears Torn Over Drug Labeling Case, LEGAL TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/articles.jsp?id=1202425751725 (quoting legal 
expert’s belief that a ruling in favor of federal preemption can be expected in this case because 
there was no evidence that Wyeth withheld information from the FDA). 
 143. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 30–31 (“Nothing in the FDCA’s history 
suggests that Congress either viewed state-law claims intended to promote public safety and 
compensate injured patients as conflicting with the federal scheme or intended to allow FDA 
[approval] to immunize drug manufacturers from such claims.”). 
 144. Id. at 32. 
 145. Id. at 46. 
 146. Id. at 50. 
 147. Id. at 32. 
 148. Id. 
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from the argument that the FDA’s preference for the use of a specific 
label indicated that the IV-push method could not be proscribed or 
more strongly cautioned against.149 Despite this reasoning, discussion 
at the Oral Argument indicated that the Supreme Court is not likely 
to read § 314.70(c)(6) quite as expansively as the Vermont Supreme 
Court.150 
Wyeth has the momentum of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc.,151 supporting the push for preemption. 
Although Reigel involved regulations that included an express 
preemption clause, the eight to one decision stressed the importance 
of the FDA’s authority to balance benefits and risks of proposed 
medical devices.152 In addition, though it is unclear whether the FDA 
specifically considered the risks and benefits of the IV-push 
procedure (as opposed to intravenous administration in general), 
there is a valid argument that the risk could have been considered and 
resolved in favor or preserving the IV-push method of administration 
for the benefit of more immediate nausea relief.153 
If the United States Supreme Court overturns the Vermont 
Supreme Court’s decision, the holding is likely to be extremely 
narrow and focus on two primary facts: first, the fact that the FDA 
had all of the relevant information and, second, the fact that Wyeth 
provided four specific references to the dangers of intravenous 
administration on the Phenergan label. Even though these specific 
references failed to clearly distinguish between the IV-push and the 
IV-drip methods of intravenous administration, and even though it 
seems the FDA failed to properly analyze the risks and benefits of 
each method of administration individually, there was no indication 
that Wyeth misrepresented facts to the FDA. 
Questions from the Supreme Court Justices at the Oral Argument 
tended to focus specifically on what information was submitted to, 
 
 149. See Brief of Former FDA Commissioners Kennedy and Kessler, supra note 116, at 14-
15 (finding Wyeth’s argument fails because few, if any, cases show that the FDA resists when 
companies try to strengthen warning labels). 
 150. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–41, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3, 
2008) (noting the Justices’ tendency to construe the requirement in 21 C.F.R § 314(c)(6) as 
being triggered by the revelation of “new” information). 
 151. Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 152. Id. at 1008. 
 153. See Mauro, supra note 142 (noting how Scalia and several other Justices seemed 
persuaded that Wyeth acted properly and according to FDA procedure in notifying the FDA of 
the risk and should not be punished for the FDA’s error in judgment). 
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and reviewed by, the FDA.154 Evidently, the Court was trying to 
determine whether the FDA balanced the risks and benefits of the 
IV-push procedure independent from the IV-drip method of 
intravenous administration.155 Some Justices, most prominently Justice 
Ginsberg, refused to accept that the FDA could properly perform the 
balancing procedure and decide that the benefits of the IV-push 
procedure outweighed the risk.156 
Because there was no evidence that Wyeth attempted to withhold 
information and because Wyeth followed the FDA’s reporting 
requirements, the Court will likely rule in favor of Wyeth based on a 
narrowly construed implied preemption theory. The Court will likely 
find that an actual conflict between state and federal law was present 
under the circumstances because the state law provided an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of Congressional objectives. Congress intended 
for the FDA to have the authority to make careful balancing decisions 
regarding the safety, effectiveness, and accessibility of drugs in the US 
market.157 So long as the FDA was equipped with the appropriate 
information to make such a decision, its authority should not be 
usurped by state court decisions. As Justice Scalia indicated in the 
Oral Argument, it appears in this instance that Wyeth complied with 
the applicable statutory requirements, thus either the FDA or the 
physician who improperly administered the Phenergan should be 
responsible for the injury.158 
In spite of the potentially favorable holding, the recent election of 
a democratic President along with a majority of democrats in 
Congress could soon set efforts in motion to combat any pro-
preemption decisions granted by the Court.159 Several key democratic 
figures, including Senator Henry Waxman, the Chairman of the House 
of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, have expressed grave concern over the FDA’s new policy on 
 
 154. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1–17, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3, 
2008). 
 155. See id. at 5 (“[T]he FDA was aware of the IV use and a certain risk. But did it ever 
discreetly consider the IV-push verses the IV administered the usual way by a drip bag?”). 
 156. Id. at 7 (“[T]he risk of gangrene and amputation is there. No matter what benefit there 
was, how could the benefit outweigh that substantial risk.”). 
 157. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (West 2008) (stating the purpose of the FDA is to 
promote safety, effectiveness, and accessibility of drugs sold in the U.S. market). 
 158. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3, 
2008). 
 159. Tony Mauro, War Over Wyeth, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=1202426836486. 
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preemption.160 An October 2008 report prepared for Senator Waxman 
quoted veteran FDA officials stating the agency’s new regulations on 
preemption were based on “gross misstatements” that were “naïve to 
what actually occurs in practice.”161 With a democratic majority in 
Washington, it is likely that the movement to combat the FDA’s new 
policy on preemption, along with any protections granted to 
pharmaceutical companies by the Supreme Court in this decision, will 
only gain momentum. 
 
 160. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV. REFORM at 3, 110TH CONG., MAJ. 
STAFF REPORT ON FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES 
(Comm. Print Oct. 2008). 
 161. Id. 
